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THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF DECREES OF
DISMISSAL.
The fact that a final adjudication in favor of the defendant in
chancery results in a decree that the bill be dismissed, instead of
the more precise and definite language of a judgment in favor of
the defendant at law, has sometimes caused uncertainty as to
whether the dismissal intended amounted to a mere withdrawal
of the case in its then form, or an adjudication which would
prove a bar to a reopening of the issues. The opportunity for
misunderstanding is, perhaps, increased by the fact that the word
dismiss is in common use in reference to suits at law, to mean
simply the discontinuance of a cause, with the right to begin it
over again and litigate the same matters.
Where the decree is properly drawn and shows clearly the
grounds on which the court acted, there is little room for doubt.
In general, decrees of dismissal, with language aptly worded,
because the action has been prematurely brought,' or for lack
of jurisdiction,2 or for want of proper parties, 8 or for merely
formal or technical defects, 4 do not constitute a bar to a subsequent
suit. And so, too, voluntary dismissals by the complainant, and
dismissals for want of prosecution, are in general no bar, unless
when entered in an advanced stage of the cause, as will be here-
after considered. And on the other hand, unqualified decrees of
dismissal, which clearly show on their face an adjudication of
the merits, whether on demurrer or plea, on bill and answer, or
on pleadings and evidence, as obviously do constitute a bar.
This must, of course, be understood subject to the usual rules in
regard to identity of parties and issues, and bearing in mind
that an adjudication that the complainant has no case in chan-
cery does not necessarily deprive him of the right to sue at law,
if, for example, his bill has been dismissed solely for the reason
that he has an adequate remedy at law.
In the middle ground between decrees which clearly do not
constitute res adudicata, and decrees which clearly do, lie cer-
1 Foster v. The Richard Busteed, oo Mass. 409.
2Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. i6o.
8St. Romes v. Levee Cotton Press Co., 127 U. S. 6x4.
4Gilmer v. Morris, 3o Fed. Rep. 476.
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tain classes of decrees not so summarily to be disposed of, which
it is the purpose of this article to examine, having in view the
ascertainment of the law as it has been applied in various juris-
dictions, rather than the reconcilement of the different authori-
ties.
The general rule for the construction of unqualified decrees
of dismissal is thus stated by Chief Justice Shaw in the case of
Footev. Gibbs, i Gray 412:
"The authorities, both in England and this country, are de-
cisive that a general entry of 'bill dismissed,' with no words of
qualification, such as 'dismissed without prejudice,' or 'without
prejudice to an action at law,' or the like, is conclusively pre-
sumed to be upon the merits, and is a final determination of the
controversy." To the same effect are numerous other cases, the
most apposite of which are cited in the margin.5
With but slight exception there is a general concurrence of
the authorities in this doctrine. In one case in Maryland 6 it
was said that a decree of dismissal was not a bar unless it was
shown that there was an absolute determination that the party
had no title, and that the matter was res adjudicata, but the point
was outside the questions actually decided, and the case cannot
be considered an authority in conflict with the prevailing view.
In cases where the record discloses that the dismissal might
well have been on grounds not going to the merits, some courts
have been reluctant to apply the principle of presumptions in all
its strictness. For example, in an Ohio case 7 where the issues
had not been closed, either by setting down the plea for hear-
ing, or by a replication, it was said that the bill might have
been dismissed for want of prosecution, and that no presumption
would be indulged that the merits had been passed on. The
court said, however, that where it appears that the dismissal was
upon a hearing of the case, it is to be inferred that it was upon
the merits.
So in the case of Foster v. The Richard Busteed. 1oo Mass.
409, where the court considered the effect of the entry "Petition
5 Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107; Lyon v. Perin Mfg. Co., 125 U. S.
698; Bigelow v. Winsor, i Gray 299; Tankersly v. Pettis, 71 Ala. T79; Taylor
v. Yarbrough, r3 Gratt. 183; Curts v,. Bardstown, 6 J. J. Mar. 536; Kelsey v,.
Murphy, 26 Pa. St. 78; Adams v. Cameron, 40 Mich. 5o6; Burton v. Burton,
58 Vt. 414; Garrick v. Chamberlain, 97 Ill. 620; Knowlton v. Hanbury, i7
IlL 471; Stickney v. Goudy, 132 Ill. 213; Armstead v. Blickman, 5i Ill. App.
470.
6 Chasers Case, i Bland Ch. 206, 17 Am, Dec. 277.
7 Loudenback v. Collins, 4 0. St. 251.
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dismissed," in an action for the purpose of enforcing a lien on a
vessel. The answer set up that the petition had been prema-
turely filed (which appeared to be a fact), and also grounds
going to the merits. The court said that where in an answer
several matters of defense were set forth, some of which related
to the maintenance of the suit, and some to the merits, and there
was a general decree of dismissal, the merits could not be
assumed to have been passed on, and the decree would not be
held to be a bar.
Decrees of dismissal which show on their face that the com-
plainant consented to a dismissal on the merits,8 and also those
made because of failure of proof, 9 are considered a bar.
The proper form of the decree, and the only one which can
be relied upon to put beyond the possibility of doubt its con-
struction, where the court intends to permit a simple discon-
tinuance of the suit, without concluding the parties on the issues,
is to dismiss the bill "without prejudice." Where a bill is dis-
missed without prejudice, the grounds for the reservation can-
not be reexamined in another suit, and the decree is not subject
to collateral attack to show that in fact the merits were involved
on the hearing, and that the provision that the decree should be
without prejudice was erroneous.10
An appeal lies, however, directly from such a decree, and if
the decree should clearly have been absolute it will be reversed
and ordered so modified."
Where an absolute decree of dismissal has been entered, the
decree may be amended on appeal so as to read without preju-
dice. 12
Uncertainty is sometimes liable to arise where a decree of
dismissal in chancery is pleaded to an action at law. For exam-
ple, in an Ohio case Is the court had before it a question of this
sort, and held that where a demurrer for want of equity was
sustained, and the decree was that the complainant was not
entitled to the relief sought and that the bill be dismissed, it
would not be assumed that anything but the right to equitable
8 Pelton v. Mott, zi Vt. 148, 34 Am. Dec. 678; Donnelly v. Wilcox, 113 N.
C. 408, i8 S. E. Rep. 339.
9 Cochran v. Couper, 2 Del Ch. 27, McWhorter v. Norris (Ind. App.), 34.
N. E. Rep. 854.
loWanzer v. Self, 30 0. St. 378.
11 Wanzer v. Self, sufira.
l2Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, and cases cited. See Gove v. Lyford,
44 N. H. 525, where a motion to add "without prejudice" was denied.
18 Lore v. Truman, 1o 0. St. 45.
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relief was adjudicated, and that an action at law was not barred.
And later cases in the same court 14 indicate that a decree of
dismissal without qualification simply determines the right to
equitable relief, and does not bar a suit at law for the same cause
of action.
It is obvious, however, that a chancery suit may adjudicate
not only the right to equitable relief, but particular points or the
precise question which may afterwards be presented in a suit at
law. A decree on the merits puts an end to all further contro-
versy concerning the points thus decided between the parties to
the suit.15 Where the reservation of the right to sue at law, or
the reason of the court's action, does not affirmatively appear
from the record, there may be much difficulty in determining
how far there has been an adjudication of the issues which are
subsequently raised at law-a question which does not seem to
have been particularly examined except in these Ohio cases,
which present only one phase of it.
We come now to cases dismissed for want of prosecution, or
voluntarily dismissed by the complainant. In regard to these
two classes, and especially the latter class, a difference in prac-
tice between courts of law and chancery has sometimes misled
the practitioner. Under the common law, as modified by the
statute of 2 Hen. IV., ch. 7, a voluntary nonsuit could be
taken up to the time that the jury announced its verdict, and
under the practice as it exists in most of the States at the pres-
ent day a nonsuit can be taken up to the time that the jury re-
tires from the box, without creating any bar to a subsequent
suit based on the same cause of action. In chancery, however,
according to the weight of recent authority, a voluntary dis-
missal of a case cannot be entered after the cause has been
set down for final hearing, without incurring the risk of the
decree of dismissal operating as a conclusive adjudication of the
merits, and dismissals for want of prosecution stand very much
on the same footing.
There is some conflict of authority on this subject, much of it
traceable to differences in the chancery rules of different juris-
dictions.
Under the English chancery practice as it existed prior to
1845 there was no rule of court explicitly providing for the effect
of dismissals of this character. The cases are not all in accord,
but in general the doctrine prevailed that if a complainant
14 Cramer v. Moore, 36 0. St. 347; Porter v. Wagner, ib. 471.
15 Bank of U. S. v. Beverly, i How. 148; Smith v,. Kernochen, 7 How. X98.
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obtained leave to dismiss his bill on payment of costs, even at
the hearing, and at any time up to the decree, orif the bill was
dismissed at the hearing for failure of the complainant to appear,
the dismissal would not operate as a bar.1
6
In the case of Pickett v. Loggon, 14 Ves. 232, Lord Eldon
said:
"At the same time, if a party thInks proper to bring his
cause to a hearing upon examination of witnesses, publication
passed, and the cause capable of being opened, and then makes
default, it is very difficult, and would be rather mischievous, to
treat such conduct merely as a non-suit at law?'
And in a case in the Irish court of chancery 1
7 it was held that
a dismissal by the complainant at the final hearing, after publi-
cation had passed, was a bar.
Among the chancery rules adopted in England in 1845 was a
rule providing that a dismissal on the plaintiff's motion or on
his default, after the cause has been set down to be heard, un-
less the court otherwise orders, is equivalent to a dismissal on
the merits, and may be pleaded as a bar.
18
Wherever this rule has been adopted the practice is freed
from considerable doubt. In at least one State, and probably in
others, the rules provide that after a cause has been set down
for a hearing, either party may have the cause heard on notice,
and if one or the other of the parties does not attend, the cause
may nevertheless be proceeded in, and such decree rendered as
the right and justice of the case may require.
19
The rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United
States for the Federal courts of equity have no provision on the
subject. It was accordingly held by Justice Clifford, that in the
absence of any special rule of the circuit court, the procedure
must be governed by the English practice as it existed in 1842,
when the general equity rules were adopted, which practice he
construed to permit a withdrawal of the case at any time before
decree. 20
The United States Supreme Court has not passed on the pre-
cise point, though two cases are instructive as to the general
principles. In Lyon v. Perin Mfanufacturing Company, 125 U.
S. 698, the complainant introduced evidence to show that a prior
16 Carrington v. Holley, i Dick. 280.
17 Byrne v. Frere, 2 Molloy 157.
18 Ord. XXIII. 13-see i Dan. Ch. Pl. & Pr. (5th ed.) 659.
19 Fla. Eq. Rules 86.
20 Badger v. Badger, I Cliff. 237.
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decree of dismissal was entered for failure of the complainant to
appear upon the call of the case, after answer and replication had
been filed, and after the time for taking testimony had expired
without any testimony having been taken. The decree recited
that the cause being submitted upon bill, answer and replica-
tion, the court decreed that the equities were with the defend-
ant, and that the bill be dismissed. The court held that the de-
cree, being absolute in its terms, must be considered a bar.
In Durant v. Essex Company, 7 Wall. 107, the circuit court
made a decree on final hearing as to some of the defendants in
favor of the complainant, who was dissatisfied with the relief
accorded him, and declined to accept it. The court thereupon
dismissed the bill This decree being affirmed on appeal by a
divided court, the complainant moved in the circuit court for
leave to discontinue the suit, or that the bill be dismissed with-
out prejudice, which motion was denied. The Supreme Court
held that these proceedings constituted a bar to the maintenance.
of a new bill.
In one case in a United States circuit court,21 the doctrine of
Durant v. Essex Company was invoked to justify a plea of re
adjudicata, based on an order noting the death and striking the
name of one out of several defendants, on complainant's motion,
before the taking of testimony was closed. It is doubtful if this
case can be sustained on principle.
The earlier cases in the court of chancery of New York held
that a complainant might get leave to dismiss his bill on pay-
ment of costs, before an interlocutory or final decree, without
losing the right to begin his case over again,22 and that a dismis-
sal for failure to prosecute at the final hearing did not constitute
a bar.2 In a later case decided by the Court of Appeals, 2 ' how-
ever, the court held, Justice Bronson doubting, that a decree of
dismissal where the cause had been set down for hearing after
replication and an order closing the proofs, was a bar, although
no proofs were in fact introduced, and the decree was taken by
default at the hearing. The case of Byrne v. Frere, supra, was
cited as authority, and Chancellor Kent's ruling in Rosse v. Rust
,was overruled. I cannot find that the authority of Ogsbury v.
LaFarge has since been called in question in New York.
In Massachusetts the question was considered incidentally in
21 Howth v. Owens, 30 Fed. Rep. 9io.
22 Cummins v. Bennett, 8 Paige 79.
23 Rosse v'. Rust, 4 Johns. Ch. 3oo.
24 Ogsbury v. LaFarge, 2 N. Y. 113.
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the case of Bigelow v. Winsor, i Gray 299, 301, where Chief
Justice Shaw- said:
"Sometimes, indeed, a party plaintiff in equity who, because
he is not prepared with his proofs, or for other reasons, desires
not to go into a hearing, but rather to have his bill dismissed, in
the nature of a discontinuance or non-suit, in an action at law,
may be allowed to do so; but we believe the uniform practice in
such case is to enter 'dismissed without prejudice.' "
Later, the point was decided in Borrowscale v. Tuttle, 5 Allen
377. Here a bill to redeem, requiring an answer under oath,
was dismissed on motion of the plaintiff, without the knowledge
of the defendant, after answer, and after the expiration of the
time allowed by the rules of the court for the plaintiff to file his
replication. It was held that this decree must be conclusively
presumed to have been upon the merits, and must be held a
bar to a subsequent bill. The authority of this case, which was
cited with approval by Judge Story,2 does not appear to have
been doubted, but in the later case of Kempton v. Burgess, 136
Mass. 192, the court made some remarks which seem to coun-
tenance a different theory. Here, before the hearing on the
merits, the plaintiff moved for leave to discontinue, which motion
was overruled, and a decree made dismissing the bill in general
terms. On the plaintiff's appeal, the decree was ordered modi-
fied so that the bill should be dismissed without prejudice.
Chief Justice Morton, in delivering the opinion, took occasion to
say:
"If, at the time of the hearing, a plaintiff in equity is not
ready to go on, and the court refuses to grant further time, he
may move for an order dismissing his bill, which will be granted
upon payment of the costs; if he does not do so, the defendant is
not entitled to a decree upon the merits, but can only have the
bill dismissed for want of prosecution, and such a dismissal, like
a dismissal upon plaintiff's motion, is not a bar to a new bill."
Borrowscale v. Tuttle does not seem to have been called to the
attention of the court, though Foote v. Gibbs and Bigelow v.
Winsor are cited with approval, together with Cummins v. Ben-
nett, 8 Paige 79, whose authority was shaken, if not destroyed,
by Ogsbury v. LaFarge. If the decree as it stood had been
pleaded in another suit, a different question would have been
raised. The distinction is clearly pointed out in a Kentucky
case, where it was held that an absolute decree of dismissal for
25 Story Eq. PL., § 793 a.
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want of parties would be reversed and modified on appeal so as
to read without prejudice, but that if not revised on appeal,
it would be held a bar to another suit.2
The subsequent case of Bradley v. Bradley, i6o Mass. 258,
treating of a decree on a libel for divorce, cited Borrowscale v.
Tuttle with approval, the court thus stating the law of estoppels
by decree:
"The entry 'Libel dismissed,' without the addition of the
words 'without prejudice,' purports to be a final judgment upon
the merits. It is a bar to any further proceedings upon the
cause of action set out in the libel. In collateral proceedings it
is not conclusive by way of estoppel, or as evidence, except upon
matters actually tried and determined, but as a final disposition
of that for which the suit was brought, it is, like a judgment by
default, conclusive as well in regard to the matters which might
have been pleaded as those which were formally put in issue."
In other States the decisions are not altogether in unison. In
Michigan it was held 27 that an absolute decree of dismissal upon
the plaintiff's consent, upon a hearing on pleadings and proofs,
was a bar, the court saying that the effect of a voluntar r dis-
missal of a complainant's bill was the same as an adverse one, if
made upon the hearing, when the merits were involved.
In a case in Iowa 28 in which the Massachusetts cases were
examined, the decree considered recited that the complainant's
solicitors withdrew their appearance, and that the bill was dis-
missed upon the pleadings and proofs. This decree was held to
be a bar.
In Mississippi the court said in one case: 2 "It is true that
the complainant may, at any time before final decision by the
chancellor, dismiss his bill, but if the dismissal is made after the
cause is set down for final hearing, it will have the effect, unless
otherwise ordered by the chancellor, of a dismissal on the merits,
and may be pleaded in bar to another suit."
In a later case in the same State,8° the decree showed that the
case came on for final hearing, and the complainant failing to
appear, on motion of the defendant the bill was dismissed. The
court held here that the defendant might have submitted the
cause for final hearing, in which case the decree would have been
26Thompson v. Clay, 3 T. B. Mon. 359. i6 Am. Dec. zoS.
27 Edgar v. Buck, 65 Mich. 356.
28Scully v. C. B. & Q. R. R., 46 Ia. 528.
29 Phillips v. Wormley, 58 Miss. 398.
SO Baird v,. Bardwell, 6o Miss. x64.
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a bar, but having moved to dismiss for want of prosecution, the
decree was not a bar. The court refused to follow Byrne v.
Frere and Ogsbury v. LaFarge.
In Vermont, in a case 8 1 citing the overruled case of Rosse v.
Rust as one of its authorities, the court held that no bar was
created by a decree which recited that the case being called to be
heard on the merits, the solicitor for the orator appeared and
declined a hearing, and thereupon it was ordered that the bill be
dismissed.
In a recent Florida case, 2 where on the complainant's motion
a decree of dismissal without prejudice was entered at the final
hearing, the court refused to reverse the decree and make it
absolute on the defendant's appeal, the special circumstances
apparently contributing largely to the decision arrived at.
After looking over the field that we have hastily surveyed, it
will be noticed what a very important part the words "without
prejudice" play. It has been said in connection with proposi-
tions of compromise that there is no magic in these words, but as
applied to decrees the observation loses force. A consideration
of the various cases, if it does not lead to any definite conclusion
as to universally applicable principles, at least points one qnoral,
which all the cases tend to illustrate, and that is that the form of
a decree of dismissal is worthy of the closest scrutiny and the
most watchful care of counsel.
Thomas Mills Day, Jr.
81 Porter v. Vaughn, 26 Vt. 624.
32 Robbins v. Hanbury, 37 Fla. 468.
